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ABSTRACT
Saving money should not be expensive. Compensation “clawbacks” are a legal
mechanism for companies to reclaim employee compensation, but the legislative
framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal clawback
provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221
(TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956—as well as voluntary contractual clawback policies. This comment untangles the web of clawback legislation by overlaying each
clawback mechanism to extract a single, clear, and concise description of executive compensation clawbacks, called the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.”
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the legal and
regulatory framework: clawbacks increase agency costs. In other words, they are
expensive. The logical solution involves legislative repeal, legislative amendment,
or regulatory policy shift with respect to executive compensation clawback provisions.

I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2016, the American public was outraged when Wells Fargo CEO John
Stumpf testified before the Senate Banking Committee that his employees stole
from roughly two million of their customers. 1 Compensation “clawbacks” have
been used to recover $69,000,000 from Stumpf. 2 Although many were satisfied
by Stumpf’s fate, the Wells Fargo scandal highlights a larger debate in American
jurisprudence over whether clawbacks are a sound corporate governance tool. 3
Compensation clawbacks are a legal mechanism for companies to reclaim
employee compensation,4 but the legislative framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal clawback provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley §
304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956, as
well as relevant proposed legislation. In addition, companies often utilize contractual clawback policies with coverage extending beyond statutory requirements. 5
Furthermore, each clawback mechanism has distinct targets, triggers, penalties,
1
See Sean Duffy (@RepSeanDuffy), Duffy Questions Wells Fargo CEO, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inagswcdxgI.
2
See infra notes 202, 209.
3
Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘Clawbacks’ Could Backfire, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/clawbacks-could-backfire.html?_r=0.
4
What Is A Clawback Provision?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-is-a-clawback-provision/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
5
See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co., Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders 47–50 (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016-proxystatement.pdf.
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enforcement bodies, and purposes. This paper untangles the complex web of clawback legislation by examining each factor with respect to each clawback mechanism, then overlays the clawback mechanisms to extract a single, clear, and concise description of executive compensation clawbacks called the “Comprehensive
Clawback Coverage.”
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the current
legal frame work: clawbacks increase agency costs.6 To facilitate a better understanding of the practical effects of clawbacks, this comment includes two case
studies, including the Wells Fargo scandal involving John Stumpf, as well as an
original empirical study by the author. The analysis leads to only one logical solution to the agency cost problem that strains companies, shareholders, and the
American financial system: repeal or amend the statutory clawback provisions.
II. STATUTORY CLAWBACK MECHANISMS
Under federal law, there are four statutory clawback mechanisms: SarbanesOxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (TARP), and the proposed
regulations pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 956. This section distinguishes and discusses the target, trigger, penalty, enforcement, and purpose of each statutory
clawback.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 targets the compensation of the chief executive officer
and chief financial officer of an issuer that files accounting statements with the
SEC.7 In June 2016, JPMorgan estimated that there were 4,333 publicly-listed
companies to which Section 304 would apply.8
Clawbacks under § 304 are triggered “[i]f an issuer is required to prepare an
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result
of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities
laws.”9 Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 outlines the financial reporting requirements, which
require “the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers . . . [to] certify in each annual or quarterly report . . . [and] the
signing officers—(A) [to be held] responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls.”10
6
In the context of executive compensation, “agency costs” are costs incurred by companies as a
result of conflicts of interest between companies and their executives. See infra note 196.
7
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745 [hereinafter SarbanesOxley] (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2002)).
8
Rayhanul Ibrahim, The Number of Publicly-Traded US Companies is Down 46% in the Past
Two Decades, YAHOO: FINANCE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/jp-startup-publiccompanies-fewer-000000709.html.
9
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304(a).
10
Id. at § 302.
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While § 304 does not define “misconduct,” the standard of liability is whether
the CEO or the CFO “believed, knew, or should have known that the information
was material and incorrect.”11 Case law has determined that personal misconduct
by the CEO or the CFO is not required; misconduct by anyone in the company
can trigger a clawback.12 For example in SEC v. Jenkins, an Arizona district court
denied the defendant CEO’s motion to dismiss even though the complaint did not
allege wrongdoing by the CEO.13 In SEC v. Jensen, the Ninth Circuit also held
that “the disgorgement remedy authorized under [Sarbanes-Oxley §] 304 applies
regardless of whether a restatement was caused by the personal misconduct of an
issuer's CEO and CFO or by other issuer misconduct.” 14
The penalty under § 304 is mandatory15 reimbursement of any
bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received . . . from the issuer during the 12–month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission
(whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying
such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12–
month period.16
Only the SEC has the authority to enforce § 304 clawbacks;17 § 304 does not
expressly create a private right of action.18 In In Re Digimarc Corporation Litigation, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that § 304 does not create an implied private right
of action either, because other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, “expressly create[] a
private right of action to enforce” and the absence of an express private right of
action must have been intentional.19 Other federal circuits concur with this interpretation.20
By implication, companies are also prohibited from indemnifying CEOs and
CFOs subject to § 304 clawbacks.21 In Cohen v. Viray, the Second Circuit held

11
SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, MORRISON
FOERSTER (Sept. 4, 2002), https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/sec-requires-ceo-and-cfocertification-of-quarterly-and-annual-reports.html.
12
SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2010).
13
See generally Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
14
SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016).
15
Section 304 “imposes a mandatory duty on those subject to it . . . CEO and CFO ‘shall reimburse’ . . . [and] it vests the SEC with the authority to exempt any person from the obligation.” Cohen
v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)).
16
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304.
17
Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1)).
18
Diaz v. Davis (In Re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008).
19
Id. at 1232.
20
See, e.g., Cohen 622 F.3d at 195; Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v.
Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
21
See generally Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195.
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that, “indemnification and release provisions of the Settlement violate § 304.” 22
The court reasoned that “Congress . . . provided only the SEC authority to exempt
persons from § 304(a), indicating that only the SEC has that authority and that
other parties do not.”23 The court also reasoned that indemnification must be prohibited, because § 304 would otherwise have no deterrent effect if CEOs and
CFOs could defer liability to the company. 24 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is not entirely correct, because executives still “suffer a penalty”
when bargaining for indemnification protections upon hiring,25 often accepting a
lower salary in return.26 More accurately, indemnification would allow executives
to accelerate the timing of paying for wrongdoings.
The strongest criticism of § 304 is that if the SEC does not enforce clawbacks,
§ 304 is powerless. In practice, SEC enforcement has been rare; the first § 304
clawback did not occur until more than five years after Sarbanes-Oxley was
adopted.27 By 2008, the SEC had only brought two § 304 actions despite thousands of accounting restatements.28 By 2012, the SEC clawed back compensation
from just ten CEOs or CFOs.29 One study calculated that by the end of 2016, only
twenty-five CEOs or CFOs had ever been subject to § 304 compensation “recoveries,” which does not distinguish between clawbacks and voluntary reimbursement.30 Of those twenty-five recoveries, nine did not involve executive misconduct.31
Section 304’s purposes are 1) to primarily “ensure that a company’s CEO and
CFO take a proactive role in their company’s public disclosure,”32 2) equitable,
and 3) incidentally punitive.

22

Id. at 192.
Id. at 194.
24
Id. at 195.
25
Cf. discussion infra Section V. Part B. (discussing “ex ante” indemnification costs for executives without indemnification protection).
26
Richard Harroch, Negotiating Employment Agreements: Checklist of 14 Key Issues, FORBES:
ENTREPRENEURS (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2013/11/11/negotiatingemployment-agreements-checklist-of-14-key-issues/#581888e724c6.
27
“. . . UnitedHealth Groups former CEO William McGuire was forced to return $600 million
in compensation.” Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are and How We Got There,
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 89 (Constantinides, Harris, & Stulz, eds., 2013) (citing
Phyllis Plitch, Paydirt: Sarbanes-Oxley a Pussycat on ‘Clawbacks,’ DOW JONES NEWSWIRES (2006);
Bowe & White, Record Payback over Options, FINANCIAL TIMES (2007)).
28
Sam Sharp, Whose Money Is It Anyway? Why Dodd-Frank Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks Are Bad Public Policy, 10 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 328 (2012).
29
Id.
30
Jesse M. Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback app. tbls. 1, 2 (Eur. Corp. Goverance
Inst., Working Paper No. 314/2016, Sept. 26, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764409.
31
Id.
32
See SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, supra note
11.
23
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First, § 304 incentivizes managerial oversight of full and accurate financial
disclosures. In its entirety, Sarbanes-Oxley was “designed to improve the quality
of and transparency in financial reporting and auditing of public companies” 33 in
the aftermath of numerous accounting scandals. 34 Sarbanes-Oxley was therefore
created to reform disclosure practices, rather than directly reform compensation
regulations.35 Section 302 requires “the principal executive officer or officers and
the principal financial officer or officers . . . [to] certify in each annual or quarterly
report . . . [and] the signing officers—(A) are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls.”36 Section 304 imposes clawbacks on CEOs and
CFOs who fail to meet the § 302 accounting disclosure and internal control
maintenance requirements.37 By requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify accounting
statements that may lead to personal compensation clawbacks, the CEO and the
CFO—the individuals in the best position to ensure accurate disclosures—are incentivized to provide the most accurate disclosure possible.
Second, § 304 achieves equitable reimbursement to the company. In SEC v.
Microtune, the SEC argued that “repayment of profits from stock sales under Section 304 . . . restores the status quo ante by returning equity-based compensation
to [the company].”38 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit supported the same justification,
explaining that § 304’s “disgorgement remedies are equitable (in the sense that
they require wrongdoers to reimburse the issuer for ill-gotten gains).”39 The Federal District of Arizona was less decisive, however, stating that “it is not clear . .
. that the statute’s purpose must be remedial.”40 Regardless, the effect of a clawback—returning money to a company—is certainly equitable.
Equitable reimbursement can also be viewed from the perspective of preventing unjust enrichment to executives who do not deserve to keep the profits. Some
justify § 304 clawbacks because “the CEO may unfairly benefit from a misperception of the financial position of the issuer that results from those misstated
financials, even if the CEO was unaware of the misconduct leading to misstated

33

Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005, 1018 (May 2004) (referring to the Tyco, Adelphia, and Worldcom
scandals).
35
See SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, supra note
11.
36
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 302.
37
Id. at § 304.
38
SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Miss. Dep't of
Econ. & Cmty. Dev. v. United States DOL, 90 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1996)).
39
Diaz v. Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008).
40
SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2010).
34
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financials.”41 Profits earned during the twelve-month period preceding an accounting misstatement would also benefit an executive who did not “perform” for
that pay.42
Third, legislative history and case law suggest that § 304 is at most incidentally punitive. The House Bill proposing § 30443 required scienter, limiting
clawbacks to situations where “the [Securities and Exchange] Commission can
prove extreme misconduct on the part of [the] officer or director” to disgorge
profits.44 The final version approved by the Senate eliminated the scienter requirement.45 In SEC v. Microtune, the SEC also acknowledged that “repayment of profits from stock sales under Section 304 . . . is not punitive.”46 In 2010, an Arizona
district court hesitantly stated, “Nor is it yet clear . . . that [Section 304] has punitive aspects.”47 In 2012, however, the Ninth Circuit decisively held that “Ninth
Circuit law is clear that the reimbursement provision of [Sarbanes-Oxley §] 304
is considered an equitable disgorgement remedy and not a legal penalty.” 48
Still, § 304 resembles a quasi-criminal punishment. The Second Circuit reasoned that it was “Congress’s effort[] to make high ranking corporate officers of
public companies directly responsible for their actions,” so long as enforcement
was in the public’s interest.49 An explicit punitive purpose may be problematic
though, by tying penalties to events unrelated to the clawback trigger. 50 For example, § 304 requires disgorgement of “any . . . incentive-based or equity-based
compensation,” but does not distinguish between the stock value that accrued before and after the trigger; clawbacks can include stock value that accrued before
the wrongdoing.51 The defendant CEO in SEC v. Jenkins similarly argued that any
benefit he might have received from the sale of stock was “not, in any way, traceable to any misstatement of [the company’s] financial positions.” 52 Because determining § 304 had a punitive purpose would have implicated constitutionallyrequired findings of culpability, 53 the court inferred that Congress did not intend

41

Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1073.
43
H.R. 3763 §12; Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.
44
H.R. Rep. No. 107-414, at 44 (2002); Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
45
See S. 2673, 107th Cong. (June 25, 2002); see also H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (July 15, 2002).
46
SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Brief Opinion at
5–6; citing Miss. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Dev. v. United States DOL, 90 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir.
1996)).
47
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
48
SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012).
49
Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010).
50
Kelsh, supra note 34, at 1030–34.
51
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304.
52
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
53
“As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘impose[] substantive limits beyond which penalties may not go’[footnote omitted]. One significant such limit is that on certain impositions of liability in the absence of personal
culpability.” Kelsh, supra note 34, at 1030–31.
42
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to require personal wrongdoing—only wrongdoing by the corporate entity. 54
Therefore, it is not necessary to piecemeal disgorged profits to the extent of the
executive’s role.55
On one hand, § 304 can never be entirely unrelated to the CEO or the CFO,
because the CEO and the CFO are required to sign and endorse accounting statements pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley § 302.56 In addition, an explicit punitive purpose might deter the types of “accounting debacles57” that Congress intended to
deter. Like the Dodd-Frank Pay-Ratio provisions,58 which arguably deter excessive compensation packages by shaming executives, 59 an explicit punitive purpose in § 304 might shame and deter executives from engaging in conduct that
triggers clawbacks.
In conclusion, § 304 is primarily intended to ensure the CEO and the CFO
provide full and accurate disclosure in accounting statements. Additionally, § 304
provides an equitable remedy. While § 304 is not explicitly punitive, it somewhat
resembles the punitive aspect of the House Bill that was never implemented. In
practice, the SEC can more easily enforce clawbacks without having to prove an
additional punitive element. Furthermore, facilitating enforcement while avoiding
Constitutional hurdles is preferable to the deterrent benefits of an explicit punitive
justification—which seem to permeate into the courts’ § 304 decisions anyway.60
B. Dodd-Frank Section 954
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act targets the compensation of “any current or former executive officer of the
issuer who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options
awarded as compensation) during the three-year period preceding the date on
which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement.”61 In 2015, the
SEC estimated that § 954 was applicable to approximately 4,845 listed companies.62
Clawbacks under § 954 are triggered if “the issuer is required to prepare an
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any
54

Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074–76.
See generally SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010).
56
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 302.
57
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).
58
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 § 951 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
59
Murphy, supra note 27, at 117.
60
See, e.g., Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (“make high ranking corporate
officers of public companies directly responsible for their actions”).
61
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2) (emphasis added).
62
Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41143,
41172 (proposed July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/07/14/2015-16613/listing-standards-for-recovery-of-erroneously-a
warded-compensation [hereinafter Listing Standards].
55
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financial reporting requirement under the securities laws . . . [that requires] an
accounting restatement.”63 Furthermore, § 954 has a mandatory clawback trigger,
because it “require[s] each issuer to develop and implement a policy . . . [whereby]
the issuer will recover [compensation].”64
Section 954 lacks a misconduct requirement. As it currently stands, executives may be required to return excess incentive-based compensation even if they
had no role in the accounting misstatement. 65 This may change in the near future
however. The Republican House released a “discussion draft” of the Financial
CHOICE Act of 2017 (dubbed the “CHOICE Act 2.0” 66) on April 19, 2017 that
would amend Dodd-Frank § 954 to apply “where such executive officer had control or authority over the financial reporting that resulted in the accounting restatement.”67
The penalty under § 954 allows the
issuer [to] recover . . . any . . . incentive-based compensation
(including stock options awarded as compensation) during the
3–year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required
to prepare an accounting restatement . . . in excess of what
would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement.68
Section 954 is therefore backward-looking, disgorging compensation received within the period of three years before an accounting restatement.
Section 954 is enforced by 1) the SEC, 2) publicly listed companies, and 3)
national securities exchanges and national securities associations. First, the SEC
“shall require each issuer to develop and implement a [clawback] policy” in compliance with § 954(b).69 Second, publicly listed companies are required to enforce
those clawback policies.70 Section 954 creates both a direct cause of action,
brought by the board of directors, and a derivative cause of action, brought by the
shareholders. Third, national securities exchanges and national securities associations are required to de-list companies that do not develop and implement a clawback policy in compliance with § 954(b).71
63

Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2).
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b).
65
Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41176.
66
John C. Dugan & Randy Benjenk, CHOICE Act 2.0: House Financial Services Committee
Revises Regulatory Reform Bill, HARVARD L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/08/choice-act-2-0house-financial-services-committee-revises-regulatory-reform-bill/.
67
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 §849, H.R.__ [Discussion Draft], 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_2.0_discussion_draft.pdf.
68
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2).
69
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b).
70
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2).
71
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(a).
64
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Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the purpose of Dodd-Frank is best understood in historical context. Dodd-Frank was enacted in response to the 2008 financial crisis. 72
In its entirety, Dodd-Frank was enacted to “promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”73
Specifically, § 954 is corrective and equitable, focusing only on unjust enrichment from compensation not “earned.” 74 The SEC explained that, “shareholders of these listed issuers would benefit from a policy to recover excess incentivebased compensation and that . . . will further the statutory goal of assuring that
executive officers do not retain incentive-based compensation that they received
erroneously.”75 Furthermore, by limiting the clawback to the excess of what
would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement,
§ 954 is not punitive.
Some commentators criticize the scope of companies to which § 954 applies.76 By applying to all listed companies, § 954 effectively reformed United
States corporate law as a whole, rather than targeting only the “too big to fail”
financial institutions as Dodd-Frank intended. For example, in the SEC’s Proposed Listing Standards, the SEC stated, “we read the language of Section 10D
[as modified by Dodd-Frank Section 954] as generally calling for a broad application of the mandated listing standards.”77 Section 954’s broad application seems
to fulfill the “Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law” that Stephen Bainbridge
predicted in 2003 after Sarbanes-Oxley.78
Furthermore, § 954 may create incentives that are misaligned with DoddFrank’s purpose. For example, Dodd-Frank does not specifically deter the executives able to “promote the financial stability of the United States.” By broadly
applying to “any executive” at a target company, Dodd-Frank impacts many executives with no access and control over compliance with accounting standards, 79
even though this ultra-broad scope will eventually include the decision makers.
72
See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-feltfive-years-article.
73
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction.
74
See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement: Statement at an Open Meeting on DoddFrank Act “Clawback” Provision, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 1, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/making-executive-compensation-more-accountable-.html.
75
Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41147.
76
See, e.g., Jesse Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback, OTC SPACE: HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.theotcspace.com/content/rationalizing-dodd-frankclawback.
77
Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41176.
78
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REGULATION 26,
31 (2003).
79
Sharp, supra note 28, at 336.
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In addition, executives might be incentivized to hide accounting errors, rather
than promote transparency. For example, by triggering clawbacks at the moment
accounting restatements are required, executives are incentivized to hide, rather
than correct, past accounting errors that may trigger clawbacks of their own compensation.80 This suggests that agency costs are increased by misalignment of
shareholder and managerial interests.
In conclusion, the general purpose of Dodd-Frank is to ensure U.S. economic
stability and to prevent systemic economic failures. The purpose of § 954 is corrective and equitable, but arguably reaches beyond the general purpose of DoddFrank and creates unfavorable incentives.
C. TARP Executive Compensation Provisions
The executive compensation provisions of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) are codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5221.81 Section 5221 targets the compensation of the “top 5 most highly paid executives of a public company . . . and
any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees . . . .”82 Section 5221 only
applies to those employees of a TARP recipient company that have not repaid the
U.S. Treasury, which includes, “any entity that has received or will receive financial assistance under the financial assistance provided under the TARP.” 83 Because § 5221 only applies to TARP recipients with outstanding debts, the number
of companies subject to § 5221 will diminish as debts are repaid to the Treasury. 84
While TARP funds were initially distributed to eight major banks, 85 there were
eventually 966 TARP recipients.86 780 of which received funds in the form of
investments,87 subjecting them to § 5221 clawbacks. Of those 780 investment recipients, 734 were banks.88 As of 2017, TARP funds from 41 recipients are still
outstanding89 and subject to § 5221 clawbacks.

80

Id.
(as amended by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(3)(B) and the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 7001).
82
12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B).
83
12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(a)(3).
84
Joseph E. Bachelder III, Clawbacks Under Dodd-Frank and Other Federal Statutes,
HARVARD L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (June 9, 2011),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/06/09/clawbacks-under-dodd-frank-and-other-federal-statutes/
85
Murphy, supra note 27, at 104.
86
The State of the Bailout, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last updated
Mar. 6, 2017).
87
Id.
88
See CNN, Bailed Out Banks, CNN: MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited Mar 20, 2017).
89
See State of the Bailout, supra note 86.
81
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Clawbacks under § 5221 are triggered by, “statements of earnings, revenues,
gains, or other criteria that are later found to be materially inaccurate.” 90 Ambiguously, the “facts and circumstances” determine whether a statement is materially
inaccurate.91 While personal misconduct is not required,92 knowingly false statements and omissions are always considered materially inaccurate.93 Furthermore,
§ 5221 clawbacks are not limited to financial misstatements under federal securities law, because some companies that received TARP funds are not required to
file with the SEC.94
The penalty under § 5221 is a mandatory clawback of, “any bonus, retention
award, or incentive compensation,”95 which is not expressly limited to the excess
compensation received as a result of the inaccurate financial statement.96 Furthermore, § 5221 applies retroactively97 rather than only to compensation after a financial misstatement. Section 5221 also does not reference any time period and
can apply as far back as the date on which TARP funds were received.98
A TARP recipient must enforce § 5221 clawbacks, “except to the extent it
demonstrates that it is unreasonable to do so, for example if the expense of enforcing the rights would exceed the amount recovered.”99 It is unclear whether the
Treasury Secretary or Special Master also have a cause of action to specifically
enforce clawbacks against a TARP recipient employee. 100
Like Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, the purpose of § 5221 is best understood in historical context. TARP was a direct response to the 2008 financial crisis, granting the Treasury Secretary authority to initiate capital injections into failing companies to prevent national economic collapse. 101 Specifically, § 5221 was
also intended to protect the government’s investment in TARP recipients, and
reign in excessive Wall Street bonuses.
90

12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B).
What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009).
92
Bachelder, supra note 84.
93
What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009).
94
Bachelder, supra note 84.
95
12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B).
96
Bachelder, supra note 84.
97
Murphy, supra note 27, at 104.
98
See Bachelder, supra note 84.
99
What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009).
100
12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(2) (“The Secretary shall require each TARP recipient to meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and corporate governance.”); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL,
Treasury Regulations Governing Compensation for TARP Participants 16 (June 17, 2009),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/document-library/clsbsbdl_document/files/06.16.09.exec.comp.pdf.
101
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program (last updated Oct. 16, 2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/
cap/Pages/overview.aspx.
91
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First, § 5221 seeks to avoid another financial crisis by targeting individuals
most likely to cause systemic financial risk. While executives are often the “decision makers” at recipient companies, highly-paid non-executive employees
played a major role in the 2008 financial crisis. 102 Section 5221 therefore targets
five executives, but also the next twenty most highly-compensated employees because “banks can have non-officer employees making significantly more than the
highest-paid officers.”103 In addition, § 5221 can apply to unlisted companies not
required to file with the SEC if they received TARP funds. 104 Section 5221 can
therefore apply to companies such as hedge funds 105 that are otherwise unregulated by clawback provisions linked to the SEC financial misstatements.
Second, the government sought to protect its investment in TARP recipients
on behalf of American taxpayers.106 For each TARP recipient, the government
functions either as a shareholder with an equity position or as a lender with a
creditor position.107 Section 5221 incentivizes executives and highly-paid employees to protect the government’s financial interest and that of the U.S. taxpayer.
Third, legislative history suggests § 5221 was intended to reign in Wall Street
compensation at the financial institutions responsible for the 2008 crisis. Originally, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s TARP proposal, “contained no constraints on executive compensation, fearing that restrictions would discourage
firms from selling potentially valuable assets to the government at relatively bargain prices.”108 On the other hand, “[l]imiting executive pay . . . was a long-time
top priority for Democrats and some Republican congressmen, who viewed the
‘Wall Street bonus culture’ as a root cause of the financial crisis.” 109 Congress
ultimately prevailed over Paulson.

102

See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72.
Bachelder, supra note 80.
104
§ 5221 does not single out listed companies, but instead broadly targets any “TARP recipients.” See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(2).
105
SEC, Fact Answers: Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC: Investor Information (Dec. 4, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answershedgehtm.html (“hedge funds are not subject to some of the
regulations that are designed to protect investors”).
106
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note 101.
107
TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance; Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed.
Reg. 113 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 30).
108
Murphy, supra note 27, at 103.
109
Id.
103
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D. Dodd-Frank Section 956
Section 956 imposes requirements on both “Appropriate Federal Regulators”110 and “Covered Financial Institutions.”111 Moreover, § 956 defers rule-making obligations to the Appropriate Federal Regulators to determine clawback triggers and penalties for the targets defined in § 956.112
First, § 956 requires the six Appropriate Federal Regulators to,
jointly prescribe [disclosure] regulations or guidelines [applicable to] each covered financial institution . . . [and to] prohibit
any types of incentive-based payment arrangement . . . that the
regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered
financial institutions (1) by providing . . . excessive compensation . . . or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the
covered financial institution.113
While § 956 does not define “inappropriate risks,” Dodd-Frank’s statement
of purpose114 suggests that inappropriate risks are risks that jeopardize the financial stability of the United States and fail to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, similar to financial practices that caused the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis.115
Second, § 956 requires Covered Financial Institutions to “disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrangements . . . sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure (A)

110
“[T]he term ‘[A]ppropriate Federal [R]egulator’ means the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency.” Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at §
956(e)(1).
111
Covered Financial Institutions include, “(A) a depository institution or depository institution
holding company . . . (B) a broker-dealer . . . (C) a credit union . . . (D) an investment advisor . . . (E)
the Federal National Mortgage Association; (F) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; and
(G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal regulators, jointly, by rule, determine
should be treated as a covered financial institution for purposes of this section.” Dodd-Frank, supra
note 58, at § 956(e). The House Committee on Financial Services further explained that, “covered
financial institutions include banks, broker-dealers, investment advisers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
and possibly a wide array of other companies, such as insurance subsidiaries of a covered institution.”
H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV. 114TH CONG., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT: CREATING HOPE AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTORS, CONSUMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS: A REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL TO
REFORM THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 110 (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Financial Choice
Act 1.0].
112
See generally Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 956.
113
Id. at § 956(a), (b).
114
Id. at Introduction.
115
See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72.
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provides . . . excessive compensation, fees, or . . . (B) could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.” 116 Within these Covered Financial Institutions, § 956 targets, “an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of [a] covered financial institution . . . [that implements] an
incentive-based payment arrangement . . . [and has] assets [equal to or greater]
than $1 Billion.”117 On one hand, § 956 targets a broader scope of employees than
any other clawback statute; on the other hand, § 956 targets a narrow group of
companies (Covered Financial Institutions) similar to TARP, which almost exclusively targets financial institutions as well.118
The purpose of § 956 is to ensure U.S. economic stability and prevent systemic economic failures.119 Section 956 specifically addresses the “evidence that
flawed incentive-based compensation practices in the financial industry were
one of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in 2007,” 120
because § 956 is triggered by excessive compensation or compensation arrangements that could lead to material financial loss. By targeting a large group of
employees at a small group of financial institutions, the combined scope of § 956
more directly addresses Dodd-Frank’s general purpose121 than § 954, which may
reach beyond Dodd-Frank’s general purpose.122
1. Dodd-Frank Section 956 Proposed Rules
The Appropriate Federal Regulators proposed regulations in 2011 pursuant
to § 956123 which were revised and re-proposed in 2016.124 As of July 2017, the
2016 proposal (Proposed Rules) is still pending, and likely will not apply to Covered Financial Institutions any earlier than 2019. 125 The Proposed Rules would
require compensation deferral arrangements, but the triggers, penalties, and enforcement of clawbacks are ultimately discretionary. 126

116

Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 956(a).
Id. at § 956.
118
State of the Bailout, supra note 86.
119
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction.
120
Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37669, 37674 (proposed June
10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1232, 236, 372, 42, 741, 751, 240, 275, 303), https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2016/06/10/2016-11788/incentive-based-compensation-arrangements.
121
Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction.
122
See Fried, supra note 76.
123
Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21169 (proposed April 14, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1232, 236, 372, 42, 563, 741, 751, 248).
124
See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37669, supra note
120.
125
“The compliance date of the proposed rule would be no later than the beginning of the first
calendar quarter that begins at least 540 days after a final rule is published in the Federal Register. The
proposed rule would not apply to any incentive-based compensation plan with a performance period
that begins before the compliance date.” Id. at 37679.
126
See generally id. at 37669.
117
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The Proposed Rules would target Senior Executive Officers 127 and Significant Risk Takers,128 because these are the individuals who “initiate activities that
generate risk of material financial loss . . .[and] play an important role in identifying, addressing, and mitigating that risk.” 129 The Proposed Rules would only
target these individuals at Covered Institutions, 130 which are distinguished by
size as Level 1 (assets greater than $250 billion) and Level 2 (assets between $50
billion and $250 billion).131
Clawbacks under the Proposed Rules would be triggered if “the covered
institution determines that the senior executive officer or significant risk-taker engaged in misconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational harm to
the covered institution, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used
to determine the senior executive officer or significant risk-taker’s incentivebased compensation.”132
Furthermore, the Proposed Rules clarify two significant ambiguities regarding the clawback policies Covered Institutions would be required to implement. First, excessive compensation is defined as compensation that is “unreasonable or disproportionate to the value of the services performed by a covered
person,” taking into account various factors.133 Second, incentive-based compensation would “encourage inappropriate risks that could lead to material financial
127
“Senior Executive Officer” is defined as a, “person who holds the title or, without regard to
title, salary, or compensation, performs the function of one or more of the following positions at a
covered institution for any period of time in the relevant performance period: President, chief executive officer (CEO), executive chairman, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief investment officer, chief legal officer, chief lending officer, chief risk officer, chief compliance officer, chief
audit executive, chief credit officer, chief accounting officer, or head of a major business line or control
function.” Id. at 37691.
128
“Significant Risk-Takers” are defined as, “individuals who are not senior executive officers
but are in the position to put a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution at risk of material financial loss
. . . .” which occurs if either of two tests are met: “The [Relative Compensation Test] is based on the
amounts of annual base salary and incentive-based compensation of a covered person relative to other
covered persons working for the covered institution and its affiliate covered institutions . . . [and] The
[Exposure Test] is based on whether the covered person has authority to commit or expose 0.5 percent
or more of the capital of the covered institution or an affiliate that is itself a covered institution.” Id.
at 37691–92.
129
Id. at 37691.
130
The Proposed Rules clarify that Covered Financial Institutions are more clearly defined as
any institution regulated by the six Appropriate Federal Regulators. Id. at 37684.
131
Id. at 37687. The Proposed Rules also define “Level 3” Covered Financial Institutions, to
which clawbacks would not apply. Id.
132
Id. at 37681.
133
The factors considered include: 1) The combined value of all compensation, fees, or benefits
provided to a covered person; 2) The compensation history of the covered person and other individuals
with comparable expertise at the covered institution; 3) The financial condition of the covered institution; 4) Compensation practices at comparable institutions, based upon such factors as asset size, geographic location, and the complexity of the covered institution's operations and assets; 5) For postemployment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to the covered institution; 6) any connection
between the covered person and any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or
insider abuse with regard to the covered institution. Id. at 37679.
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loss to the covered institution,” unless certain conditions are met. 134
The penalty under the Proposed Rules would be complicated by mandatory
compensation deferral arrangements, requiring portions of compensation to vest
pro rata over a minimum number of years. The specific requirements vary based
on 1) Level 1 and Level 2 Institutions, 2) Senior Executive Officers and Significant Risk Takers, and 3) Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plans 135 and Qualifying Incentive-Based Compensation.136 The following table137 consolidates the
minimum compensation deferral amounts under the Proposed Rules.

Level 1
Institutions

Level 2
Institutions

Qualifying Incentive-Based Compensation
Long-Term Incentive Plan
Qualifying Incentive-Based Compensation
Long Term Incentive Plan

Senior Executive
Officer
60% for at least 4
years

Significant Risk
Taker
50% for at least 4
years

60% for at least 2
years
50% for at least 3
years

50% for at least 2
years
40% for at least 3
years

50% for at least 1
year

40% for at least 1
year

Compensation not yet vested would be subject to forfeiture or downward adjustment (essentially ex ante clawbacks), and vested compensation would be subject to clawbacks.138 The Proposed Rules would require Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions to 1) consider imposing forfeiture or downward adjustment of
unvested, deferred compensation under certain circumstances139 and 2) adopt policies empowering the Covered Institution to clawback vested compensation for at

134
Those conditions are that the compensation arrangement: “[1] Appropriately balances risk
and reward; [2] Is compatible with effective risk management and controls; and [3] Is supported by
effective governance.” Id. Furthermore, Incentive-based compensation would not “appropriately balance risk and reward, unless it: [1] Includes financial and non-financial measures of performance; [2]
Is designed to allow non-financial measures of performance to override financial measures of performance, when appropriate; and [3] Is subject to adjustment to reflect actual losses, inappropriate risks
taken, compliance deficiencies, or other measures or aspects of financial and non-financial performance.” Id. at 37679–80.
135
“Long-term incentive plan means a plan to provide incentive-based compensation that is
based on a performance period of at least three years.” Id. at 37801.
136
“Qualifying incentive-based compensation means the amount of incentive-based compensation . . . excluding amounts awarded . . . under a long-term incentive plan.” Id.
137
This table was consolidated by the author using the SEC’s Proposed Rules pursuant to DoddFrank Section 956. See id. at 37679–80.
138
Id.
139
Those conditions are: “[1] Poor financial performance attributable to a significant deviation
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least, “seven years following the date on which such compensation vests.” 140
Compensation recovery is thus both forward-looking (forfeiture and downward
adjustment)
and backward-looking (clawbacks) under the Proposed Rules.
Clawbacks would also be discretionary141 and enforced only by the Covered
Institution.142 Level 1 and Level 2 companies would be required to maintain policies and procedures that “[i]dentify and describe the role of any employees, committees, or groups authorized to make incentive-based compensation decisions,
including when discretion is authorized; [and] [d]escribe how discretion is exercised to achieve balance.”143
The purpose of the Proposed Rules is consistent with the purpose of § 956.
For example, the Proposed Rules distinguish between larger Level 1 and Level 2
financial institutions because, “larger financial institutions can present greater potential systemic risks . . . to U.S. financial stability.” 144 In addition, deferral requirements were proposed to function as a “tool to balance risk and reward.” 145
In conclusion, the Proposed Rules further clarify the mandatory clawback
policies required by § 956. Although the Proposed Rules would require mandatory
compensation deferral, the triggers, penalties, and enforcement of clawbacks and
the forfeiture would ultimately be discretionary.
2. Analysis of Dodd-Frank Section 956 Proposed Rules
The Proposed Rules have yet to gain clear support. Some argue that the Proposed Rules are under-inclusive and fail to achieve the purpose of § 956, while
others argue that the Proposed Rules are over-inclusive, unwise public policy.
This argument stems from the basis that: 1) the deferral period is too short;
2) clawbacks should be mandatory, not discretionary; and 3) clawback triggers
are too limited.146 First, the deferral period is too short. Several U.S. Senators
have argued that the effects of executive wrongdoing often manifest over a much
from the covered institution's risk parameters set forth in the covered institution's policies and procedures; [2] Inappropriate risk-taking, regardless of the impact on financial performance; [3] Material
risk management or control failures; [4] Non-compliance with statutory, regulatory, or supervisory
standards resulting in enforcement or legal action brought by a federal or state regulator or agency, or
a requirement that the covered institution report a restatement of a financial statement to correct a
material error; and [5] Other aspects of conduct or poor performance as defined by the covered institution.” Id. at 37681.
140
Id.
141
Id. (Clawbacks are only triggered “if the covered institution determines . . .”).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 37682.
144
Id. at 37716.
145
Id. at 37717.
146
See Robert Menendez et. al., Comment Letter from Certain Senators Regarding Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Incentive-Based Compensation Pursuant to Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/IncentiveBased-Pay-Letter-Wells-Fargo-Sec-956-2016-10-26.pdf [hereinafter Senate Letter].
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longer time-frame than the maximum four-year deferral arrangement.147 For example, in the recent Wells Fargo fraudulent accounts scandal,148 fraudulent bank
accounts dating back to 2005 were not publicly recognized until 2013. 149 Wells
Fargo clawbacks have not been triggered under current statutory clawback provisions and would not be triggered under the Proposed Rules. Instead, clawbacks
only occurred under the company’s voluntary contractual clawback policy, 150
and only after CEO John Stumpf’s highly-publicized Senate Banking Committee
Hearing.151
Second, clawbacks should be mandatory, not discretionary. Senators have
also argued that companies rarely enforce clawbacks that are discretionary. 152
For example, Managerial Power Theory153 might explain the rare enforcement if
managerial influence over directors curtails enforcement. On the other hand,
some research suggests that rare enforcement may be due to increased compliance with securities disclosures.154
Third, the proposed clawback triggers are too limited. Because the trigger
under the Proposed Rules is limited to fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct
of individual employees, it is unclear whether negligence or oversight failures
would trigger clawbacks.155 Dodd-Frank’s purpose was to prevent systemic economic risk in response to the 2008 financial crisis, and negligence and oversight
failures contributed to that crisis.156
Others argue that the Proposed Rules are over-inclusive because: 1) the Proposed Rules cover too many issuers, executives, and types of compensation; 2)
the Proposed Rules will drive talented employees to seek jobs where regulations
do not apply; and 3) the government should not intervene in public sector decisions.
First, the Proposed Rules cover too many issuers, executives, and types of

147

See Senate Letter, supra note 146.
See discussion infra Section V.A.2.
149
Ian Mount, Wells Fargo’s Fake Accounts May Go Back More Than 10 Years, FORTUNE:
FINANCE (Oct. 12, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-scandal/.
150
Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, WELLS FARGO & Co. 47–50 (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016-proxystatement.pdf.
151
See, e.g., SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, Senator Elizabeth Warren questions Wells Fargo
CEO John Stumpf at Banking Committee Hearing, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=xJhkX74D10M.
152
See Senate Letter, supra note 146.
153
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. OF
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8-19 (2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1316&context=harvard_olin.
154
Gretchen Morgenson, Clawbacks? They’re Still a Rare Breed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/business/clawbacks-theyre-still-a-rare-breed.html.
155
Senate Letter, supra note 146.
156
See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72.
148
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compensation.157 As a result, executives may engage in actual earnings management rather than artificial misstatements, forego associated, valuable projects
that involve difficult accounting judgments, and thus, risk accounting misstatements, overinvest in financial reporting to protect themselves at a high cost to
shareholders, or otherwise attempt to reduce the clawback penalty. 158
Second, the Proposed Rules may drive talented employees to seek jobs
where regulations do not apply. The proposed “CHOICE Act 1.0” argues that,
“[f]ar from mitigating systemic risk, driving talented professionals out of the financial services sector only increases the likelihood of a future financial crisis.”159 Over-inclusive clawbacks may incentivize highly-compensated employees to leave Covered Institutions for smaller banks, hedge funds, or non-U.S.
companies.160 As a result, systemic financial risk is not eliminated; Significant
Risk Takers would merely be shuffled amongst different companies or possibly
different countries.
Third, the government should not intervene in private sector decisions. For
example, the Republican’s Financial CHOICE Act 1.0 would repeal § 956, because it gives too much power to the government to intervene in private sector
compensation decisions.161 The CHOICE Act 1.0 asserts that,
[o]nly in Washington does the idea of giving government bureaucrats – some of whom have never worked in the private
sector – the authority to dictate ‘incentive-based compensation’
standards at private companies make any sense at all. Worse
yet, the specific statutory directive on compensation is, like
much else in the Dodd-Frank Act, riddled with vague and openended terms that essentially give regulators unbridled discretion
to design compensation packages. 162
In conclusion, the Proposed Rules have yet to gain clear support while they
are currently pending approval. Some argue that the Proposed Rules are underinclusive because the deferral period is too short, the penalty should be mandatory, and the triggers are too limited; others argue that they are over-inclusive,
because the targets are too broad, unfavorable incentives are created, and the
government should not interfere with the private sector.

157

See Fried, supra note 30, at 65.
Id. at 34.
159
Financial Choice Act 1.0, supra note 111, at 110.
160
John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1071–72 (2012).
161
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
ch.4, pt. 7, § 4:90.
162
Financial Choice Act 1.0, supra note 111, at 111.
158
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III. VOLUNTARY CONTRACTUAL CLAWBACK POLICIES
Contractual clawback policies are the wildcard of clawback mechanisms.
Statutory provisions create minimum clawback requirements, but contractual
clawback policies often reiterate statutory clawback requirements or additionally
“serve to fill gaps in existing recoupment doctrine.” 163 Contractual policies are
becoming more popular; one report found that in 2003, less than 1% of companies
had clawback policies, while in 2010, 39.8% of S&P 500 companies had publicly
disclosed clawback policies.164 By 2009, 73% of Fortune 100 companies had publicly disclosed clawback policies,165 which increased to 86% in 2013.166 Companies may be adopting these policies in anticipation of the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules.
Contractual clawback policies can be tailored to target anyone the company
chooses. Trends suggest that most contractual clawbacks are triggered by financial restatements and require misconduct in ultra-large companies to a greater degree than the average listed company. For example, one study of companies in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average167 (DJIA) found that clawbacks are triggered solely
by a financial restatement in 63% of companies, either by a financial restatement
or revision of other performance metrics in 17% of companies, solely by misconduct in 13% of companies, and by “other” triggers in 7% of companies. 168 Collectively, financial restatements trigger clawbacks in 80% of DJIA companies, 169
suggesting that shareholders and investors simply demanded accurate financial
disclosures, even when not required by federal statute.
The DJIA study also found that 60% of companies require culpability, 30%
do not require culpability, and 10% of companies cannot be clearly identified into
either category.170 By contrast, a 2015 study by the SEC of all listed companies
found that only 33% specifically required misconduct. 171 This dichotomy suggests
that ultra-large companies prefer fault-based triggers, while the average listed
companies prefer no-fault triggers.
The penalties under contractual clawback provisions vary widely. The 2015
SEC study found that 61.5% of listed companies provided for recovery of any
163
Stuart R. Lombardi, Note: Interpreting Dodd-Frank Section 954: A Case for Corporate Discretion in Clawback Policies, 2011 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 881, 885 (2011).
164
Lombardi, supra note 163, at 893–94.
165
Sharp, supra note 28, at 323.
166
Murphy, supra note 27, at 113.
167
The Dow Jones Industrial Average tracks 30 of the most significant stocks traded on the
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incentive-based compensation; 73% provided for recovery of excess incentivebased compensation; and 90% had a look-back period of three years or longer. 172
The DJIA study found that only 3% of DJIA companies provided for recovery of
any incentive-based compensation; 20% provided for recovery of all or part of
incentive-based compensation; 27% provided for recovery of excess incentivebased compensation; 7% used unconventional methods; and 43% did not disclose
the amount subject to clawbacks.173
There is a clear preference for discretionary enforcement of contractual clawbacks. The DJIA study found that 100% of DJIA companies have some form of
discretion to enforce clawbacks: 80% of companies have complete discretion,
13% have discretion to determine culpability, and 7% have discretion if the company does not find the employee culpable.174
The purposes of contractual policies vary, but they are most prominently used
for 1) calming public outrage in the event of public scandal, 2) incentivizing desired behaviors, and 3) reimbursing the company or its shareholders.
First and most significantly, contractual clawbacks calm public outrage in the
event of public scandal.175 Contractual policies are often only enforced in the
event of public scandal, and “boards pull clawbacks out of their hip pocket only
when politically expedient, [which] will undermine their effectiveness as a risk
management tool.”176 Furthermore, contractual clawback policies may decrease
the likelihood of federal clawback enforcement, because “after the implementation of a recovery policy, an auditor is less likely to report a material weakness in
an issuer’s internal controls over financial reporting.” 177
Second, contractual clawback policies create incentives that align shareholder and managerial interests. Contractual clawback policies have been referred
to as a “commitment device” whereby executives are more likely to follow promises they made to their “future self.”178 Shareholders benefit when managers fulfill
their promises to shareholders. Similarly, some contractual policies expressly
seek to punish executives for specified conduct, unlike statutory clawbacks. The
market also tends to impose its own penalties for financial restatements; one study
found that from 2005–2012, the market capitalization of the average issuer declined by 2.3% after announcing a significant financial restatement.179
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Companies can also tailor contractual policies to their self-determined interests, rather than to interests defined by generalized statutes. Some argue that statutory clawbacks are unnecessary for this reason because federal requirements disrupt the ability of the shareholders and directors to decide their own rights and
powers.180
Third, contractual clawbacks compensate both the company and shareholders.181 Shareholders may be better served by contractual clawbacks, because the
company can recover compensation more efficiently than the SEC.182
In sum, although there are clear trends that companies favor discretionary
enforcement and no-fault triggers caused by financial restatements, there are no
clear trends for the amount of compensation subject to clawbacks. In addition, the
purposes behind contractual policies vary widely.
IV. COMPREHENSIVE CLAWBACK COVERAGE
This Part condenses the targets, triggers, penalties, enforcement bodies, and
purposes of each clawback mechanism to create the “Comprehensive Clawback
Coverage.” The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage provides the clearest and
most concise description of the legal framework for executive compensation
clawbacks.
First, targeted individuals are determined solely by their employment position under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954. More specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 targets only the CEO and the CFO, while Dodd-Frank § 954
targets any current or former executive officer of the issuer who received incentive-based compensation.
Targeted individuals are determined by a hybrid of position and compensation level under Dodd-Frank § 956 and TARP. The Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed
Rules target Senior Executive Officers and Significant Risk Takers. TARP targets
the top five most highly paid executives of a public company and the next twenty
most highly-compensated employees. Contractual clawback policies target any
employee who contracts for a clawback provision.
Clawback mechanisms target various groups of companies. Like SarbanesOxley § 304, which targets approximately 4,333 companies required to file with
the SEC,183 Dodd-Frank § 954 targets approximately 4,845 listed companies.184
By contrast, TARP and Dodd-Frank § 956 specifically target financial institu-
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tions. TARP targets TARP recipients with outstanding TARP funds (41 companies in 2017185), and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules target Covered Financial Institutions based on asset size. In addition, voluntary contractual clawback
policies have been adopted by nearly 90% of Fortune 100 companies 186 and 40%
of S&P 500 companies.187
Second, most clawbacks are triggered by some form of disclosure inaccuracy.
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 (misstatements) and Dodd-Frank § 954 (restatements) are
triggered by material inaccuracies under federal securities law. TARP is triggered
by a materially inaccurate financial statement but is not limited to statements required by federal securities law. Most voluntary contractual clawback policies are
also triggered by financial restatements. 188 By contrast, clawbacks under DoddFrank § 956 are triggered if the target employee “engaged in misconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational harm to the covered institution,
fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used to determine . . . incentive-based compensation.”
Clawback mechanisms are divided on whether misconduct is required. While
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules require misconduct, Dodd-Frank § 954 and TARP do not. The most recent draft of the CHOICE
Act 2.0 would add an element of misconduct to § 954 by imposing clawbacks
only where the executive “had control or authority over the financial reporting.”189
In addition, misconduct is required by voluntary contractual clawback policies in
ultra-large companies to a greater degree than the average listed company. 190
Clawbacks are discretionary under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules and
nearly all contractual clawback policies.191 For example, contractual clawbacks
were discretionary in the Wells Fargo fraudulent account scandal and the Walmart
foreign bribery scandal.192 By contrast, clawbacks are mandatory under SarbanesOxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954 (which requires target companies to adopt
policies that “will” claw back compensation under certain circumstances). Clawbacks are also mandatory under TARP unless the company can demonstrate enforcement is “unreasonable.”
Third, the clawback penalty consists of any incentive-based compensation
under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules (subject to mandatory deferral requirements) and TARP. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 also claws back any bonuses and
profits realized from the sale of stock. By contrast, Dodd-Frank § 954 limits clawbacks to the excess of what would have been paid to the executive officer under

185

State of the Bailout, supra note 82.
Murphy, supra note 27, at 113.
187
Lombardi, supra note 158, at 893–94.
188
Id.
189
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10 — 115th Congress, § 849.
190
See Lombardi, supra note 163, at 901.
191
Id.
192
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
186

2018

CLAWBACKS AND THEIR COSTLY FLAW

377

the accounting restatement. Clawback penalties under voluntary contractual clawback policies vary widely among companies. For SEC-regulated companies,
61.5% provide for recovery of any incentive-based compensation and 73% provide for recovery of excess incentive-based compensation; for DJIA companies,
27% claw back the portion erroneously awarded, while 23% claw back all or part
of the amount realized (43% not reporting). 193
The time period subject to clawbacks is 12 months after accounting misstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304; 3 years preceding an accounting restatement
under Dodd-Frank § 954; and any time during which TARP funds are outstanding
under TARP. In addition, one study found that 90% of DJIA companies had a
look-back period of 3 years or longer. Under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed
Rules, clawback and forfeiture time periods are dependent on mandatory compensation deferral requirements. Clawbacks are forward-looking from the moment of
the clawback trigger under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules on Forfeiture, but backward-looking under Dodd-Frank § 954,
TARP, and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules on Clawbacks.
Fourth, clawbacks are enforced only by the SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley §
304. By contrast, clawbacks are enforced by the company under TARP, DoddFrank § 954, and the Dodd-Frank § 965 Proposed Rules—although the SEC and
Listing Exchanges also have tangential enforcement obligations. In addition, voluntary contractual clawback policies are enforced by companies under state law.
Fifth, the purpose of clawbacks mechanisms vary widely. Purposes under
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 include encouraging proactive oversight, equity, and punishment (though not explicitly). TARP, Dodd-Frank § 954, and Dodd-Frank § 956
are intended to ensure national economic stability, although Dodd-Frank § 954
arguably reaches beyond this purpose by broadly reforming U.S. corporate law.194
TARP was additionally intended to protect the government’s investment in TARP
recipients and reign in excessive Wall Street bonuses. Contractual clawback policies are often used to calm public outrage, reimburse the company, and incentivize desired behavior.195
Clawback purposes expose the alignment of interests under each clawback
mechanism. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 aligns the interests of managers and investors
by preventing manipulation of financial disclosures. Dodd-Frank § 954 aligns the
interests of managers and society by preventing another economic crisis. TARP
aligns the interests of managers and the government by protecting the government’s financial investment. Voluntary contractual clawback policies align the
managers’ interests with the company’s interests, as defined by the board in executive employment contracts, by granting the board discretion to enforce clawbacks.
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V. THE FLAW: CLAWBACKS INCREASE AGENCY COSTS
Michael Jensen and William Meckling first identified the “agency problem”
in executive compensation: conflicts of interest between companies and executives generate additional costs for companies that are ultimately borne by shareholders.196 Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by 1) failing to prevent executive wrongdoing, 2) possibly increasing executive compensation in the form of
a “risk premium,” 3) incentivizing the circumvention of clawback rules, and 4)
driving away talented employees.
A. Clawbacks Increase Agency Costs by Failing to Prevent Costly
Executive Wrongdoing
Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by failing to prevent costly executive wrongdoing, because 1) the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is weak,
and 2) discretionary clawbacks are often not enforced in relation to the underlying wrongdoing, as illustrated by case studies of Wells Fargo and Walmart.
1. The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is Weak
Kevin Murphy explained that the statutory “‘clawback’ provision of Sarbanes-Oxley—which was subsequently extended in the TARP legislation and
Dodd-Frank . . . was notable mostly for its ineffectiveness.” 197 On the surface,
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 applies to thousands of SEC-regulated companies, but only
the CEO and the CFO are targeted, and clawbacks have been enforced against no
more than twenty-five individuals as of 2017.198 In addition, TARP only applies
to a diminishing group of financial institutions. 199 While Dodd-Frank § 954 targets a broad group of employees and a broad group of companies, the penalty
clawing back excess realized compensation is merely corrective and not punitive.200 In addition, contractual clawback policies and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules provide for discretionary enforcement, which is often used to calm
public outrage after a scandal, rather than prevent the underlying wrongdoing.201
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is therefore too weak and disorganized
to effectively deter costly executive wrongdoing.
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2. Case Studies
Two case studies demonstrate that discretionary clawback enforcement is often tied to a company’s financial success rather than the underlying wrongdoing.
First, discretionary contractual clawbacks were enforced in the Wells Fargo fraudulent account scandal only when the company suffered long-term financial harm.
Second, discretionary contractual clawbacks were never enforced in the Walmart
foreign bribery scandal, where the company did not suffer long-term financial
harm.
i. The Wells Fargo Fraudulent Account Scandal
Wells Fargo has maintained a contractual policy authorizing clawbacks for
causing “reputational or other harm to the Company.” 202 Since 2002, former Wells
Fargo CEO John Stumpf, who then served as head of Wells Fargo’s southwest
and western regional banking groups, knew of employees’ systemic practice to
fraudulently open customer accounts in order to meet internal sales targets. 203
Over the next decade, executives were consistently notified about similar fraud. 204
In 2010, the Office of the Comptroller, one of the Appropriate Federal Regulators enforcing Dodd-Frank clawbacks,205 failed to notify the public or take action against Wells Fargo,206 admitting in 2017 to “several missed opportunities to
perform comprehensive analyses and take more timely action beginning in
2010.”207 As of 2017, statutory clawbacks have not been enforced, most likely due
to Regulator apathy and enforcement difficulty.208
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In 2013, the Los Angeles Times publicly exposed the scandal for the first
time, resulting in public outrage.209 Clawbacks were not enforced under Wells
Fargo’s contractual policy210 immediately after the public exposure, even though
employees fraudulently opened more than two million fake accounts.211 Instead,
the company fired 5,300 employees and paid $185 million in government fines.212
On September 20, 2016, public outrage peaked when Wells Fargo’s CEO
Stumpf appeared before the Senate Banking Committee, famously scolded by
Congresswoman Elizabeth Warren.213 Just five days later, Wells Fargo enforced
the contractual clawback policy, likely under the “reputational harm” provision. 214
Stumpf forfeited $41 million in bonuses and unvested equity awards; 215 Carrie
Tolstedt, head of the Community Bank division, forfeited $19 million.216 On April
10, 2017, Wells Fargo enforced additional clawbacks; Stumpf forfeited an additional $28 million and Tolstedt forfeited an additional $47.3 million. In total,
Wells Fargo clawed back more $180 million from executives.217
Wells Fargo’s clawback enforcement is correlated to the company’s financial
success, as measured by market capitalization, suggesting that clawbacks only
occurred in relation to the company’s financial success and not in relation to the
underlying wrongdoing.218
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Wells Fargo did not enforce clawbacks from 2002 to 2016 when the company
knew about the fraudulent activity, but rather when market capitalization increased by $218 billion.219 Wells Fargo’s market capitalization was $77 billion in
2002 when Stumpf first learned of the fraudulent activity, which rose to $130
billion in 2010 during the OCC investigation, which further rose to $220 billion
in 2013 after the LA Times article, which again rose to $295 billion in June
2016.220 After each significant event where Wells Fargo’s financial position did
not suffer, Wells Fargo declined to enforce clawbacks.
Wells Fargo finally enforced clawbacks in 2016 and 2017 when market capitalization declined by $61 billion and failed to recover.221 Wells Fargo’s market
capitalization dropped from $295 billion in June 2016 to $234 billion in September 2016 when Stumpf appeared before the Senate Banking Committee; 222 contractual clawbacks were enforced just five days later.223 By March 2017, Wells
Fargo’s $276 billion market capitalization failed to recover to its 2016 heights. 224
By contrast, the market capitalization of a comparable bank, JPMorgan Chase,
grew by $87 billion over the same period to reach an all-time high after President
Trump’s election.225 Failing to recover while peer banks flourished, Wells Fargo
enforced additional clawbacks in April 2017.226 After each significant event
where Wells Fargo’s financial position suffered, Wells Fargo enforced clawbacks.
In conclusion, Wells Fargo enforced clawbacks during periods of financial
harm, but not during financial success. After events causing “reputational harm”
where market capitalization nevertheless increased by $218 billion, clawbacks
were not enforced; after events causing “reputational harm” where the company’s
market capitalization declined by $61 billion, clawbacks were enforced.227 Enforcement discretion was therefore not tied to the underlying wrongdoing; otherwise, clawbacks would have been enforced on several occasions after 2002.
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ii. Walmart Foreign Bribery Scandal
Clawbacks were not enforced in connection with the Walmart foreign bribery
scandal.228 Walmart has maintained a contractual policy permitting discretionary
clawbacks if an executive “engaged in any act deemed inimical to the best interests of Wal-Mart.”229 In 2003, Walmart executives allegedly facilitated or failed
to prevent bribery of Mexican government officials to change zoning laws for new
Walmart stores.230 In 2005, Walmart’s internal compliance investigators found
“clear confirmation that . . . top executives at Wal-Mart de Mexico were well
aware of the [bribery] payments. 231 In 2012, the New York Times publicly exposed the scandal, resulting in public outrage. 232
Walmart has never exercised discretion to enforce clawbacks for this “inimical” scandal, and although shareholders demanded Walmart amend its policy to
include clawbacks triggered by unethical conduct, their demand was rejected in
2013.233 In addition, state litigation234 and federal litigation235 costing Walmart
more than $820 million in legal expenses236 were eventually dismissed.237
Walmart’s market capitalization was $207 billion in January 2003 when the
foreign bribery began,238 which rose to $210 billion in January 2012 just before
public discovery,239 which fell by $17 billion in April 2012 after public discovery240 but recovered back to $213 billion by the end of the same month.241 In April
2017, Walmart’s market capitalization reached $217 billion.
Walmart did not enforce clawbacks during periods of financial success. After
“inimical acts” where market capitalization increased, Walmart did not enforce
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clawbacks. After “inimical acts” causing financial harm followed by quick recovery, Walmart did not enforce clawbacks either. Enforcement discretion was therefore not tied to executives’ bribery; otherwise, clawbacks would have been enforced on several occasions after 2003.
iii. Findings: Discretionary Clawbacks are Enforced in Relation to
Financial Success Rather than the Underlying Wrongdoing
Effectively, Wells Fargo and Walmart utilized discretionary clawback enforcement as a public relations tool to maximize profits rather than as a deterrent
for executive wrongdoing. Like Wells Fargo, which could have enforced contractual clawbacks several times after 2002 under its “reputational harm” policy,
Walmart could have enforced clawbacks several times after 2003 under its “inimical acts” policy. Like Wells Fargo, which did not enforce clawbacks from 2002–
2016 after a public scandal when market capitalization nevertheless increased,
Walmart did not enforce clawbacks from 2003–2016 after a public scandal when
market capitalization nevertheless increased. When Wells Fargo’s market capitalization failed to recover after negative publicity from 2016–2017, clawbacks were
finally enforced; when Walmart’s market capitalization quickly recovered after
negative publicity in April 2017, clawbacks were not enforced. Both companies
apply discretionary enforcement in relation to the company’s financial success;
neither company applies discretionary enforcement in relation to the underlying
wrongdoing.
This phenomenon may be attributable to the inconsistent alignment of interests between statutory and contractual clawback mechanisms. Contractual clawbacks seek to align company interests with shareholders’ financial interests, while
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and TARP all seek, on some level, to align company interests with public interests. This misalignment might explain a more fundamental problem with clawback provisions like Dodd-Frank § 956, which require companies to adopt clawback policies intended for the government’s
interests, yet the policies are crafted to achieve the company’s interests. The Wells
Fargo and Walmart scandals illustrate how discretionary clawbacks can be used
as a strategic public relations tool.
3. Conclusion
Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by failing to prevent costly executive wrongdoing. The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is too weak and disorganized to effectively deter executive wrongdoing. In addition, two case studies illustrate how discretionary clawbacks are enforced in relation to the financial
success rather than the underlying wrongdoing: Wells Fargo only enforced clawbacks when the company failed to recover from financial harm; Walmart never
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enforced clawbacks despite shareholder pressure. As a result, each company incurred expenses, including government fines, legal fees, and stock price decline,
that negatively impacted shareholders.
B. Clawbacks May be Increasing Executive Compensation as a “Risk
Premium”
Kevin Murphy identified the concept of a “risk premium” in the context of
incentive-based compensation: executives demand higher compensation for uncertainty that compensation may never be realized.242 It logically follows that executives are incentivized to demand a risk premium for the risk of clawbacks.
Moreover, it follows that all targeted companies pay this risk premium, even if
the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is too weak to justify the premium.
In theory, clawbacks incentivize executives to negotiate for higher compensation, particularly in the form of base salary, because base salary is not subject
to clawbacks. Moreover, Managerial Power Theory suggests that executives are
able to fulfill this incentive by influencing their compensation structures.243
Several authorities suggest that the base salary has increased or will increase
as a risk premium for clawbacks. The SEC expressed concerns that in response to
Dodd-Frank clawbacks, “executive officers may demand that incentive-based
compensation comprise a smaller portion of their pay packages, or that they receive a greater total amount of compensation, to account for the possibility that
the awarded incentive-based compensation may be reduced due to future recovery.”244 The SEC also predicted that Dodd-Frank § 954 clawbacks impact not only
“the magnitude of the expected compensation, but also to how an executive views
and responds to the compensation.”245 For example, because of the increased uncertainty created by § 954’s no-fault mandatory clawback,
risk averse executives may lower the value that they attach to
the incentive-based component of their pay and . . . demand an
offset to bear the increased uncertainty . . . [either] in the form
of a smaller portion of pay being comprised of incentive-based
compensation . . . [or] an increase in expected total compensation, which would come at a greater cost to the issuer. 246
In addition, Steven Bank and George Georgiev point out that “[o]ne easy way
to game the [clawback] rules would be to receive less in incentive compensation
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and more in fixed salary.”247 Others have argued that § 954’s disjointed three-part
enforcement creates additional uncertainty for executives, 248 leading to further
base pay increases.249
In addition, financial institutions targeted by TARP and Dodd-Frank appear
to be increasing base salaries in response to clawback legislation. One American
Bar Association publication explains that, “[i]n keeping with the government’s
[legislation], numerous companies (especially financial institutions) are changing
their compensation structures . . . A number of financial institutions recently increased employees’ base compensation . . . .”250 Suggesting that base salary increases may be a response to clawbacks, another study found that,
the Troubled Asset Relief Program . . . has affected not only the
level of pay but [also] the structure of pay in a sense. . . . Budgets [for base salary] are inching up as companies begin to feel
more comfortable with business performance and to address a
pent up demand for base salary increases.251
Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley prohibition on clawback indemnification252
likely increases base salaries for CEOs and CFOs in the form of disguised ex ante
indemnification. Because traditional ex post indemnification is prohibited under
§ 304,253 CEOs and CFOs are incentivized to negotiate up front for higher base
salary to cover the risk of future clawbacks. Although the value of this risk premium cannot be quantified, it logically follows that the value would be the estimated value of future clawback liability that cannot be indemnified. Furthermore,
companies are likely paying this risk premium even though § 304 clawbacks are
statistically unlikely. Section 304 has only been enforced against twenty-five
CEOs or CFOs,254 so most never actually “use” their disguised indemnification

247
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risk premium even though nearly 4,000 SEC-regulated companies255 incur the associated agency cost.
1. Empirical Study
To analyze the influence of the clawback provisions on compensation trends,
this section presents an original empirical study of S&P 1500 CEO compensation
over the past ten years.256 This study serves two main benefits: (1) it consolidates
the year-to-year growth changes in components of executive compensation over
time and (2) it reveals trends in the portion of base salary that constitutes total
compensation. More specifically, this study seeks to answer whether executives
have begun negotiating for higher base salary in response to the clawbacks that
target incentive-based compensation.
Methodology. This study compiles data from the ExecuComp Database, 257
using the S&P 1500 sample, 258 which is most useful for analyzing the effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954, which target publicly listed companies. This study analyzes three metrics: base pay, total compensation as reported in the SEC filings, and total grant-date compensation.259 While the SEC
filings do not report total compensation prior to 2006, the ExecuComp Database
includes data on base salary and grant-date compensation dating back to 2000,
which has been included to examine trends related to Sarbanes-Oxley (2002).260
This study presents both averages and medians, which may be “more relevant
[than averages] in describing compensation for a ‘typical’ CEO” by removing
highly-paid outliers.261
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Findings. This study supports—or at least does not disprove—concerns that
clawbacks incentivize increased executive compensation. This study finds a correlation, though not causation, between the implementation of clawback statutes
and CEOs negotiating for larger base salaries. Sarbanes-Oxley was implemented
in 2002; TARP in 2008; Dodd-Frank in 2010; and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed
Rules in 2016.262 Over that time frame, 1) base salaries have steadily increased,
and 2) total compensation has increased at a slower rate than the rate at which
base salary has increased.263
Figure 1 below shows that base salary is increasing at an average of $12,444
and median of $11,619 per year. Another study also found that base salary has
been steadily increasing, and company salary budgets have increased at a median
of 3% per year from 2012–2016.264

Figure 1
While the increase in total compensation and the increase in base salary are
both slowing down, Figures 2 and 3 show that base salary is slowing down at a
lower rate, which suggests that base salary is increasing relative to total compensation and total grant-date compensation.265 More specifically, the year-to-year

262

See Discussion supra Section II.
Id.
264
Stephen Miller, Salary Budgets Expected to Rise 3% in 2017, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT.
(July 27, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/salary-budgets-2017.aspx.
265
See supra Figure 2.3
263

388

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. XI:II

increase in base pay is slowing down at an average of -1.45% per year and a median of -0.31% per year.266 The year-to-year increase in total compensation, as
reported on SEC filings, is slowing down at an average of -3.25% per year and
median of -0.51% per year.267 The year-to-year increase in total grant-date compensation is slowing down at an average of -3.60% per year and median of -0.06%
per year.268

266

Id.
Id.
268
Id.
267

2018

CLAWBACKS AND THEIR COSTLY FLAW

389
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On the other hand, Figure 4 below shows that the portion of base pay that
constitutes total compensation is decreasing at an average rate of -1.1% per year
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and median rate of -1.01% per year.269 Although S&P 1500 CEOs are undoubtedly negotiating for more base pay, they seem to bargain for slightly more compensation in other forms as well—likely bonuses.270 An S&P 500 study by Equilar
however, found that, “base salary and awarded stock grants both increased in median value in each of the past five years [from 2011–2016], while stock option
grants decreased in value at the median over that time period”271 The S&P 500
dataset suggests that executives at larger companies are in fact bargaining for
more base salary than equity compensation. 272

Figure 4
In conclusion, Figures 1–4 illustrate the correlation between the implementation of the clawback provisions, beginning with Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, and an
increase in executive compensation over the same time period.273 While this study
establishes a correlation between increased compensation and clawback provisions, several factors prevent the assertion of a causal link.274 Most notably, ex-
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ecutive compensation was increasing before the implementation of the clawbacks,275 but comparable data is not available to expand the time frame of this
study. In addition, increased base pay may be caused by various other factors,
such as concerns that incentive stock compensation is not well correlated with
performance, from which the influence of the clawback provisions cannot be
clearly distinguished.276 Still, this study demonstrates that compensation trends
are consistent with, and do not disprove, theories about executives’ logical incentive to increase compensation and base salary in response to the clawback provisions.277
If base salary is in fact increasing in response to clawbacks, it is an unfavorable public policy. In addition to the cost of salaries, Managerial Power Theory
suggests that increased compensation often leads to further increases in compensation, resembling a chain-reaction where executives’ cognitive dissonance leads
them to expect and often receive continual salary increases. 278 In 2015, the SEC
also expressed concerns that increased base pay in response to clawbacks could
“reduce pay-for-performance sensitivity and may reduce the correlation between
the executive officer’s effort to enhance value [they provide to the company].” 279
Investors may also suffer, because shifting from incentive-based compensation to
base salary allows directors to privately determine base compensation instead of
providing clear, publicly-disclosed performance metrics for stock-compensation.
C. Clawbacks Incentivize Costly Circumvention of Clawback Provisions
Because most clawbacks are triggered by some form of disclosure inaccuracy, executives may be incentivized to 1) forego valuable projects involving
difficult accounting judgments that might result in accounting misstatements; 2)
overinvest in financial reporting to protect themselves at a high cost to shareholders; and 3) attempt to reduce the effect of a clawback, resulting in a different
penalty than shareholders initially believed they approved. 280 Steven Bank and
George Georgiev have also expressed concerns that in response to clawbacks,
“executive . . . attention . . . will be wasted on developing strategies to make
executive compensation clawback-proof and on technical compliance with the
complex rules.”281 Clawbacks create incentives for unproductive and costly behavior.
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D. Clawbacks Drive Talented Employees Away from Companies Targeted
by Clawback Provisions.
The Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules may drive talented employees to seek
jobs where regulations do not apply. For example, over-inclusive clawback provisions may incentivize highly-compensated employees to leave Covered Institutions for smaller banks, hedge funds, or non-U.S. companies.282 As a result, systemic financial risks are not eliminated, but merely shuffled amongst new
companies. In reference to Dodd-Frank clawbacks, the 2016 Republican CHOICE
Act 1.0 explains that, “[f]ar from mitigating systemic risk, driving talented professionals out of the financial services sector only increases the likelihood of a
future financial crisis.”283 More drastically, over-inclusive clawbacks may drive
business out of the United States,284 creating agency costs due to sub-optimal,
long-distance business management and international transaction costs. For example, foreign companies might delist from U.S. stock exchanges in response to
Dodd-Frank clawbacks that target listed companies, because even though “U.S.
listing confers advantages on non-U.S. companies . . . the burden from the [clawback] rules may well outweigh these advantages.”285 Not only are corporate relocation costs increased, but driving companies out of the country is contrary to
Dodd-Frank’s purpose of ensuring financial stability in the United States.
VI. SOLUTION
While this comment primarily sets out to clarify executive compensation
clawbacks and highlight the major flaw that clawbacks increase agency costs, one
solution follows logically: repealing or amending statutory clawback legislation
may lower the agency costs associated with clawbacks. It is unlikely that clawbacks will be entirely repealed, but amendments appear likely in the near future.
For example, the 2017 Republican-controlled House released a draft of the
CHOICE Act 2.0 in April 2017, outlining an amendment to Dodd-Frank § 954,
but not a total repeal. Amendment or repeal might prove to be difficult in the near
future, given President Trump’s recent executive order that, “for every one new
regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for elimination.” 286
Congressional action and legislative repeal may not be required to reduce clawback agency costs though; the Appropriate Federal Regulators 287 can proscribe
new rules under Dodd-Frank § 956 to minimize executives’ risk of clawbacks and
thus decrease the associated risk premium. This route appears most likely, given
282
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that Trump’s Executive Order does not apply to independent federal regulators
like the SEC.288
Others argue that clawback provisions should be maintained or strengthened.289 Repealing clawback provisions may deprive shareholders of a tool for
holding executives accountable. When Dodd-Frank was first enacted, one commentator speculated that “clawbacks . . . may arm shareholder plaintiffs and shareholder activists with a major new weapon.”290 In addition, maintaining clawbacks
might ensure accounting compliance. One study found that, “big, ugly [material]
earnings restatements aren’t as common as they used to be . . . the number of
companies restating results peaked in 2006, at 1,550. By [2012] that figure had
fallen to 713.”291 Fewer accounting restatements may suggest that clawback provisions encourage accounting compliance.
On the other hand, the rejection of shareholder demands in the Walmart foreign bribery scandal292 demonstrates that companies are able to dominate shareholders, and rare clawback enforcement could simply be the result of the weak
Comprehensive Clawback Coverage. 293 Furthermore, reducing statutory clawback provisions would not eliminate clawbacks all together. Most companies
would likely retain contractual policies, because shareholders want and expect
them now that contractual clawback policies have become commonplace. 294 On
balance, some form of legislative repeal, legislative amendment, or regulatory
policy shift is necessary to reduce the burdensome agency costs associated with
clawback provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under U.S. law, there are five compensation clawback mechanisms. Three
are statutory: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, and 12 U.S.C. § 5221
(TARP). One is a proposed regulation pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 956. In addition,
companies often maintain contractual clawback policies with coverage extending
beyond statutory requirements. This paper analyzed the targets, triggers, penalties, enforcement bodies, and purposes of each clawback mechanism, then condensed that analysis to create the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” The
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Comprehensive Clawback Coverage provides a clear synopsis of the current legal
framework for executive compensation clawbacks.
Analysis of the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in
the current legal framework: clawbacks increase agency costs. First, clawbacks
fail to prevent costly executive wrongdoing, because the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is weak, and discretionary clawbacks are enforced in relation to a
company’s financial success rather than the underlying wrongdoing, as illustrated
by case studies of the Wells Fargo Fraudulent Account Scandal and the Walmart
Foreign Bribery Scandal. Second, logical inferences from an original empirical
study and supporting authorities suggest that the clawbacks may be increasing
executive compensation, particularly base salary, in the form of a “risk premium.”
Third, clawback provisions incentivize costly circumvention of clawback rules.
Fourth, the clawbacks drive talented employees away from companies subject to
clawbacks. The logical solution to reduce these agency costs involves a legislative
repeal, legislative amendment, or regulatory policy shift with respect to executive
compensation clawback provisions.
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VIII. APPENDIX
The following tables were used to calculate the empirical study of executive compensation trends in Section V.B.1 of this article (Figures 1–4). Further supporting
data and calculations can also be provided upon request.
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